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INTRODUCTION: THE DOG THAT DIDN
'
T BARK 
It is difficult enough identifying areas within a current field of scholar­
ship that are underdeveloped and in need of further attention. In science, one 
thinks of missing elements in the periodic table or planets in a solar system 
that our calculations tell us must be there but that our telescopes have not 
yet spotted.1 In civil-rights law, one thinks of such areas as women's sports2 
or the problems of intersectional groups, such as women of color or gay 
black men.3 One also thinks of issues that current events are constantly 
thrusting forward, such as discrimination against Arabs 4 or execution of 
children5 or the mentally retarded.6 
What of challenges that do not come readily to mind because they lie 
outside the current paradigm-problems that we do not readily think of as 
civil-rights issues at all, or that are so radically unlike those we do recognize 
that they require a leap of the imagination to see them as such?7 Here, we 
lack a template-a periodic table. We cannot easily make the link between 
the familiar and the unknown. The new issue does not lie on the same plane 
as those we know, so that mental extrapolation and interpolation do not 
readily lead us to it. 
Issues of this kind require us to expand our conceptual repertory and 
learn to think in different ways. They require us to listen for "the dog that 
doesn't bark"8-to flip a structure such as conventional civil-rights law and 
look at it sideways. They require us to look at that structure as a whole and 
consider what might be missing. 
This is a good time to step back and survey recent writings about race. 
The fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education9 has brought forth a 
at 12. 
I. See, e.g., Mary Carmichael, Astronomy: Third From Gliese, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 2005, 
2. E.g., Deborah Brake, Revisiting Title !X's Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the Three­
Part Test, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 453 (2004). 
3. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 
581 (1990) (discussing problems ofintersectional groups, such as black women). 
4. See, e.g., Charles Pope, Fear Grows that War on Terror is Trampling Rights, SEATILE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 10, 2002, at A l  (discussing concern that antiterror measures might 
endanger privacy and civil liberties). 
5. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
6. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
7. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, 2 INTERNA­
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE (2d ed. 1970) (discussing process by which scientific 
paradigms succeed and replace each other). 
8 .  See the Sherlock Holmes detective story, ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE HOUND OF THE 
BASKERVILLES (John Murray, 26th impression 1965) (1902), in which the fictional detective solves a 
mystery by noticing that neighborhood dogs did not bark at a time when everyone had thought the 
crime took place. 
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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wealth of scholarshi{>-retrospective, critical, and celebratory.10 The three 
books that I take as illustrative are each, in their way, excellent. Reflective, 
even ruminative, All Deliberate Speed interweaves the story of author 
Charles Ogletree's11 life with national events that took place during the same 
period, such as the Brown decision, the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hear­
ings, and the lawsuit for black reparations growing out of the 1921 Tulsa 
riots. Ogletree's book brings these events to life, while reinforcing how 
much remains to be done to effectuate Brown's mandate. In Whitewashing 
Race, Michael K. Brown12 and his coauthors13 put forward a scorching cri­
tique of an emerging neoconservative approach to race and show how it has 
produced a new type of tough-minded, "realist" racism exemplified by 
Stephen and Abigail Themstrom's America in Black and White: One Nation, 
lndivisible.14 Alexander Tsesis's15 book audaciously seeks to reorient racial 
jurisprudence so that it avoids the cultural inertia and doctrinal baggage that 
recent books-including the other two reviewed here--document. He seeks 
to place such jurisprudence on sounder footing. 
Although these otherwise strong books contribute greatly to current 
knowledge, they-like much recent writing about race-nevertheless devote 
scant attention to two issues that ought to be on the agenda of every serious 
treatment of race: white privilege and the place of nonblack groups such as 
Latinos and Asian Americans in the civil-rights equation. Not only for Afri­
can Americans, but also for other groups, two forces--oppression and 
favoritism-maintain white supremacy, so that ending one without attention 
to the other would do little to improve matters.16 If the demise of formal, 
state-sponsored racism has left in place a system of informal favors, ex­
changes, informational networks, old-boy references, and college-entrance 
criteria by which whites see to their own, the system of white-over-black 
power relations will hardly budge.17 White privilege thus demands the seri­
ous attention of every race scholar. 
10. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS (2004) (questioning whether Brown's 
contribution to blacks' advancement was as great as its supporters say and positing that equal school 
funding might have been a worthier goal). 
11. Jesse Climenko Professor and Vice Dean of Clinical Programs, Harvard Law School. 
12. Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics, University of California at Santa Cruz. 
13. Martin Carnoy, Professor of Education and Economics, Stanford University; Elliott 
Currie, Lecturer in Legal Studies, University of California at Berkeley; Troy Duster, Professor of 
Sociology, New York University, and Chancellor's Professor, University of California at Berkeley; 
David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Golden 
Gate University School of Law; Marjorie M. Shultz, Professor of Law, University of California at 
Berkeley (Boalt Hall); David Wellman, Professor of Community Studies, University of California at 
Santa Cruz. 
14. STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE 
NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997) [hereinafter THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE] (providing a stinging critique of race-conscious remedies). 
15. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
16. See infra Section III.B. 
17. See infra Section III.B. 
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By the same token, a simplistic approach that takes two groups, the 
white and the black, as constitutive can do little to counter the types of dis­
crimination that nonblack groups, such as Latinos, Asians, and Native 
Americans, suffer.18 Such a treatment will only be able to redress discrimi­
nation targeting these other groups to the extent that they succeed in 
analogizing their discrimination to a type that blacks encounter. A Filipino, 
for example, who suffers accent discrimination on the job, 19 or a Latina un­
able to perform jury duty because she understands Spanish and cannot be 
counted on to pay attention to the fumbling court interpreter,20 may easily 
find herself without a remedy. Blacks do not suffer discrimination based on 
a foreign-sounding accent, national origin, immigration status, or inability to 
speak English proficiently.21 Hence a Filipino, Asian, or Latino complaining 
of one of these forms of treatment is apt to find little case or statutory law in 
his or her favor. The black-white binary paradigm of race thus requires ex­
pansion to deal with our increasingly multicultural, multiracial society-and 
even, sometimes, to do justice to the black cause.22 
These two issues-white privilege and the black-white binary of race­
are the dogs that don't bark. Strikingly absent from much recent writing 
about race, they tell us a great deal about mindset,23 presupposition, and, in 
some cases, intellectual laziness, 24 racial favoritism, 2 and denial. Their ab­
sence mars the imagination, reach, and analytical power of many otherwise 
very good books. 
This Review proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the three books. Part 
II highlights what is valuable in each and points out a few minor respects in 
which they fall short. Parts III and IV identify a deeper shortcoming: the 
failure to come to terms with white privilege and the black-white binary 
paradigm of race, issues that lie outside the conventional paradigm of race 
scholarship but that are becoming more salient with each passing day. 
18. See infra Section ill.A. 
19. See. e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1333-40 (1991) (discussing the 
case of a Filipino job applicant with a heavy accent who was denied a job as a Department of Motor 
Vehicles clerk). 
20. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
21. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino­
Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 Tux. L. REV. 1181 (1997) (book review); Juan 
F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial 
Thought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213 (1997). 
22. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text (explaining how single-focus treatment 
denies one group of allies as well as a broader perspective on how the checkerboard of racial pro­
gress operates, with groups periodically advancing while others regress and with all of them 
sometimes pitted against each other for crumbs). 
23. For example, "To me, civil rights means (a) rights of all minorities, (b) rights of African 
Americans, or (c) rights of minorities, but not the privileges of whiteness." 
24. For example, "I've been studying and writing about (a), (b), or (c) above for all these 
years; why do I have to change now?" 
25. For example, "All my friends are (a), (b), or (c); their experience is really central to racial 
discourse, so I'll forget all those other issues, for now." 
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I. THREE RECENT BOOKS ON RACE 
A. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed: 
Reflections on the First Half Century of 
Brown v. Board of Education 
1273 
Part memoir, part legal history, and part legal critique, All Deliberate 
Speed is well-paced and a very good read. Beginning with the author's early 
school years as a "Brown baby" (Ogletree, pp. 15-42), the book takes the 
reader through the legal strategy that led up to Brown v. Board of Education 
(Ogletree, pp. 3-13, 111-27), juxtaposes the late Supreme Court Justice 
Thurgood Marshall with current Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas 
(Ogletree, pp. 135-37, 170-79, 183-236), and gives a behind-the-scenes 
look at the author's representation of Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas 
confirmation hearings (Ogletree, pp. 181, 202-17). It discusses the cam­
paigns for affirmative action (Ogletree, pp. 81-82, 147-66, 242-56) and 
black reparations (Ogletree, pp. 274-93), the defense of Angela Davis 
(Ogletree, p. 45), and many other national events in which the author played 
a leading part. The reader learns of Ogletree's early years living with strug­
gling black parents on the wrong side of the tracks in Merced, California 
(Ogletree, pp. 15-40), his undergraduate years at Stanford University (Ogle­
tree, pp. 41-56), and his life-changing three years at Harvard Law School 
(Ogletree, pp. 57-78). It follows him through his term with the nationally 
prominent District of Columbia Public Defender Service (Ogletree, pp. 82-
88) and his entry into teaching law. Photographs of Ogletree in his third­
grade class, as his high school's student body president, as an undergraduate 
activist at Stanford, and as a young lawyer arguing key cases enliven an al­
ready engaging book. 
The book's principal leitmotif is integration-the Brown ideal-and the 
author's ambivalence about whether the ideal is still worth striving for in the 
face of society's increasing indifference (Ogletree, pp. xiv-xvii, 259-73). 
Integration provided Ogletree with a first-rate education, yet it failed many 
other black students of his generation. In his graduating class of several 
hundred, only a handful of the dozens of black students wanted to attend a 
four-year college (Ogletree, p. 40). Some cities, such as Boston, resisted 
integration bitterly, casting abuse on defenseless black schoolchildren bused 
in from the other side of town (Ogletree, pp. 57-71). Others placed black 
and brown children in lower academic tracks or in classrooms led by teach­
ers who believed them incapable of higher intellectual achievement 
(Ogletree, pp. 33, 40). Because society seems content to pursue integration 
at "all deliberate speed," Ogletree wonders whether the black community 
would not be better off pursuing equal funding (Ogletree, pp. 234-35, 309-
10), neighborhood schools, or one of the newer alternatives such as charter 
schools (Ogletree, pp. 261, 267-70) or voucher programs that enable parents 
to send their children to any school they believe better than their current one 
(Ogletree, pp. 235-36, 261). 
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Ogletree ends on a somber note, uncertain how far U.S. society has 
come in the fifty years since the Supreme Court decided Brown (Ogletree, 
pp. 295-311). He laments the loss of great voices, such as Justice Marshall's 
and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, and the way segregation has begun to creep 
back into most of our big cities (Ogletree, p. 297). He concludes by noting 
that we stand today on the edge of a precipice and must remain vigilant to 
prevent further decline in the realization of the great principles embodied in 
this landmark case (Ogletree, pp. 298-303). 
B. Michael K. Brown, Martin Carnoy, Elliott Currie, 
Troy Duster, David B. Oppenheimer, 
Marjorie M. Shultz, and David Wellman, Whitewashing 
Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society 
Since the heyday of the civil-rights movement of the 1960s-the heady 
times that Charles Ogletree writes about-the United States has entered a 
new phase of race relations, one that emphasizes a color-blind society 
(Brown et al., pp. vii-viii, 2-5). This movement has found particular favor 
with a series of conservative and neoconservative commentators and writers 
including Dinesh D' Souza, 26 Jim Sleeper, 27 and especially Abigail and 
Stephen Thernstrom,28 who argue that the civil-rights movement has suc­
ceeded and that any lingering distress in the black community must be due 
to cultural factors inherent in that community. 29 
These "racial realists,"30 according to Brown et al., subscribe to three 
tenets (Brown et al., pp. 1-2). First, the civil-rights revolution succeeded 
when new laws banished legal segregation and outlawed discrimination in 
housing, employment, voting, and most other spheres. Second, if racial ine­
quality persists, it is due to black failure, behavioral and cultural. Third, 
because the United States has become a color-blind society with only rare, 
isolated cases of outright discrimination, race-conscious policies such as 
affirmative action are unjustified. 
Whitewashing Race confronts these contentions with a scathing refuta­
tion, composed of equal parts of terse argument crackling with indignation 
and page after page of social-science evidence. If racism lodges within the 
26. E.g., THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY (1995); II.LIBERAL 
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991). 
27. E.g., LIBERAL RACISM: How FIXATING ON RACE SUBVERTS THE AMERICAN DREAM 
(1997). 
28. E.g., AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 14; T he Real Story of Black Progress, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1997, atA20 [hereinafterThemstrom & Themstrom, Real Story]. 
29. See, e.g., Brown, et al., pp. 2-17 (describing this neo-conservative view); Themstrom & 
Themstrom, Real Story, supra note 28; see also THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK 
AND WHITE, supra note 14 (book-length treatment of black deficits and white innocence). 
30. The term is Brown's. It introduces an unfortunate confusion; Derrick Bell used the term 
much earlier in a quite different sense. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 364 
(1992) (urging a "racial realist" approach to African American civil rights that recognizes inherent 
limitations of civil rights remedies). 
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very structures of society, permeates every significant encounter, and per­
vades every period in our history, pretending to be color-blind will merely 
make matters worse (Brown et al., pp. 35-36). Racial realists deny the exis­
tence of structural racism by filtering their evidence and basing their data on 
a narrow and outmoded understanding of racism as obvious, intentional, 
evil-willed, and individual (Brown et al., p. 35). 
Public opinion polls show that smaller and smaller numbers of white 
people hate blacks, believe them stupid and inferior, and wish not to associ­
ate with them (Brown et al., p. 36). From this, racial realists conclude that 
racism is dead. Brown et al. critique these polls and present studies that 
show that American attitudes are not nearly as benevolent as the realists like 
to imagine (Brown et al., pp. 40-43). Furthermore, much racism today is 
unintentional, unstated, quite polite, and even normal (Brown et al., p. 43). 
Embedded in a host of behaviors, attitudes, expectations, rules of the game, 
and norms is a system of advantage and exclusion that constantly places 
whites on top at the expense of others-all without anyone grinding anyone 
else under his or her heel (Brown et al., p. 43). 
Making use of the concepts of accumulation and disaccumulation 
(Brown et al., pp. 22-25, 231-32), Brown and his coauthors show, in sepa­
rate chapters about markets (Brown et al., Chapter Two), education (Brown 
et al., Chapter Three), crime (Brown et al., Chapter Four), employment and 
affirmative action (Brown et al., Chapter Five), and voting (Brown et al., pp. 
Chapter Six), how whites have gained opportunities while minorities have 
lost them. Needless to say, the studies these authors highlight and the key 
moments in history-such as the G.I. Bill and the Federal Housing Act 
(Brown et al., pp. 27, 75)-they cite to show how the haves arranged to 
come out ahead differ radically from those the conservatives choose to 
trumpet. 
For example, racial realists argue that since blacks have lower gradua­
tion rates at elite colleges than whites, they would be better off attending 
less selective schools where the competition is less keen (Brown et al., p. 
115). Brown et al. show that minority students are more likely to graduate 
from elite schools than their counterparts with similar test scores who attend 
less selective schools (Brown et al., p. 116). Brown et al. posit that this is so 
because elite colleges tend to have more financial and social resources and 
make a point of nurturing and supporting all students (Brown et al., p. 116). 
They also point out that the University of Mississippi, a school the realists 
tout as a model of equal opportunity because it has a color-blind admissions 
policy, graduated only forty-eight percent of its black students, while the 
University of Virginia, an elite school that practices affirmative action, 
graduated over eighty percent (Brown et al., pp. 124-26). By subjecting 
common conservative arguments and assumptions to withering scrutiny, 
introducing new social-science evidence, and reanalyzing old data, Brown et 
al. forcefully challenge the central tenets of the new conservative racial real­
ism. Racism, although subtle, still pervades our institutions and our very 
thoughts and will not yield unless we move beyond reassuring bromides 
about color-blindness and equal opportunity. 
1276 Michigan Law Review 
C. Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment 
and American Freedom 
[Vol. 104:1269 
Most readers think of the Fourteenth Amendment31 when they think of 
civil rights and antidiscrimination remedies. Alexander Tsesis believes that 
the Thirteenth Amendment,32 which prohibited slavery and provided that 
Congress may effectuate that prohibition through appropriate legislation, is 
an underused avenue of civil-rights protection (Tsesis, pp. 6-7). He docu­
ments his argument by examining not only the legislative intent behind the 
amendment, but also the historical, political, and legal events that were tak­
ing place before, during, and after it came into being (Tsesis, pp. 6-7, 34-
43). His overall thesis is that the Thirteenth Amendment, with its abolitionist 
association, can provide civil-rights protections from current practices that 
subordinate minorities in a fashion similar to that of slavery without the doc­
trinal limitations-such as state action, intent, and an interstate economic 
impact-that courts have imposed on Fourteenth Amendment and Com­
merce Clause jurisprudence (Tsesis, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 44-46, 112-17, 130-36). 
Drawing from Justice Harlan's dissent in Hodges v. United States,33 Tse­
sis argues that the Thirteenth Amendment not only abolishes slavery but 
aims to protect fundamental liberties. The amendment recognizes that slav­
ery was not an innate condition, but one that society and the law imposed. 
Therefore, the "eradication of slavery . . . should have a social and legal 
component for achieving equal liberty" (Tsesis, p. 96). The amendment au­
thorizes judges to decide whether laws or actions resemble incidents or 
badges of slavery that impede every person's right to lead a fulfilling life 
free from indiscriminate uses of official or private power. 
For Tsesis, the Thirteenth Amendment allows Congress to advance the 
ideals of the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the Constitu­
tion-a free and equal citizenry. Furthermore, it is expansive enough to 
counter new and coercive practices in each generation. All repressive con­
duct rationally related to impediments of freedom comparable to those that 
characterized slavery could be forbidden. If Congress employs Section 2 of 
the Amendment in abusive ways that stray from its intended purpose, judi­
cial review will check that grant of power (Tsesis, pp. 22-23). 
Under current case law, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
can only enact remedial measures, not preemptive, substantive laws aimed 
at advancing national policies and human flourishing (Tsesis, pp. 46-47). 
The Thirteenth Amendment, by contrast, grants Congress the power to pass 
substantive guarantees. The case that signified this expansive reading is 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,34 in which Justice Stewart explicitly relied on 
the legislative intent, plain meaning, and judicial history of both the Thir-
31. U .S CONST. amend XIV. 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. xm. 
33. 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co. , 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
34. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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teenth Amendment and various civil-rights statutes to reach the type of dis­
criminatory practices that a builder had employed. From this opinion, Tsesis 
infers that "Congress has the power . . . rationally to determine what are the 
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that deter­
mination into effective legislation" (Tsesis, p. 86). 
The amendment can only reach infringements that are analogous to in­
voluntary servitude (Tsesis, pp. 97, 117), but Tsesis uses landmark decisions 
such as Roe v. Wade,35 Griswold v. Connecticut,36 and Loving v. Virginia37 to 
show how courts could combat latter-day infringements more directly and 
effectively under this landmark piece of legislation than under contorted 
theories of equal protection or due process (Tsesis, pp. 104-36). 
Tsesis concludes with an imaginative analysis of recent problems that 
have confounded courts and the national imagination, including Confederate 
symbols (Tsesis, pp. 97, 137-49) and hate crime (Tsesis, pp. 97, 116, 139, 
149-54), in Thirteenth Amendment terms. By guaranteeing personal safety 
and stability while banishing symbolic invocations of the horror of slavery, 
the Thirteenth Amendment can provide the flexible instrument modern soci­
ety needs to forge a future in which all may lead fulfilling and socially 
useful lives. 
II. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
All three books richly reward the serious reader and, with the few excep­
tions noted later,38 are devoid of serious deficiencies. All three are well 
written and engaging; one turns the page eager to see what comes next. All 
three incorporate history, social policy, and legal doctrine in intriguing 
ways. Each posits a clear, unitary thesis and develops it without unnecessary 
elaboration or digression. The reader is never in doubt about where the au­
thors are going. 
Tsesis's book is perhaps the most audacious and original. Brown and his 
coauthors are merciless, almost overwhelming, in their attack on a comfort­
able, inbred, conservative orthodoxy that has had its own way without much 
serious opposition. They rate high marks for sheer rhetorical and argumenta­
tive skill. Ogletree is the best pure storyteller; he knows how to invite the 
reader into his world and show what makes it go around. He holds the 
reader's attention while recounting events, large and small, over a fifty-year 
span-no small feat. 
Tsesis's is perhaps the most optimistic of the three books, arguing that 
the Thirteenth Amendment can release antidiscrimination law from its cur­
rent stranglehold. He offers a blueprint as to how desperately needed 
reforms, of the kinds Brown et al. and Ogletree highlight, can come about. 
Both Ogletree and Brown et al. are soberly realistic about the failure of 
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
37. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
38. See infra Part III. 
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integration over the past half century, noting that society has seemed per­
versely willing to pay a heavy price for integrating at "all deliberate speed." 
White Americans uncomplainingly underwrite �'the prisons, police, mopping­
up health care services, and other reactive measures predictably required by 
the maintenance of drastically unequal social conditions" (Brown et al., p. 
249). They also pay in terms of lost competitiveness and depressed perform­
ance of the U.S. economy (Brown et al., p. 249; Tsesis, p. 110). 
Ogletree and Brown et al. highlight more clearly than does Tsesis the 
need for extralegal forces and social activism in advancing a broad civil­
rights agenda. Like Ogletree, Brown and his colleagues show how white 
America must share power and resources with those whom it has grown 
accustomed to excluding from these goods. It must also make sacrifices in 
standards of living to achieve a fair and stable society (Brown et al., p. 228; 
Ogletree, p. 299). Brown et al. make plain that policies designed to combat 
racial inequality must also proceed with awareness of the complex relation­
ships between race and class. Intelligently chosen policies-such as a higher 
minimum wage-will benefit people of all races and stave off accusations 
and resentment (Brown et al., p. 230). 
The books suffer minor flaws. Tsesis should have addressed objections 
to his position. For example, could not a conservative Supreme Court im­
pose limitations on Thirteenth Amendment analysis just as it has on the 
other bases for civil-rights protection? Ogletree never addresses what could 
rekindle lost enthusiasm for black causes in a way comparable to the role 
international appearances and the threat of domestic disruption played in 
bringing about Brown v. Board of Education.39 Brown and his coauthors fo­
cus their indignation almost exclusively on Stephen and Abigail Themstrom 
and a few other neoconservative opponents of race-conscious remedies, 
overlooking other critics of affirmative action who warrant attention as 
well.40 
When Ogletree discusses affirmative action, he points out that the diver­
sity argument
41 
currently in favor masks the real, substantive reasons why it 
is still needed (Ogletree, p. 165). After all, if diversity is the real goal in 
higher education, why limit it to the two or three groups that have suffered 
historical oppression? He correctly points out that "[t]his is a particularly 
difficult question in a time [of] disconnect between the past injustices and 
oppression faced by blacks and the experience of current generations of 
whites, whose only exposure to racial classifications is their use in providing 
39. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Commentary, Brown v. Board of Education and the lnterest­
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-26 (1980). 
40. E.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE EcoNOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971 ); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); 
GLENN C. LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: EsSAYS AND REVIEWS ON RACE AND RE­
SPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA (1995); CHARLES MURRAY, LoSING GROUND (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (2004); THOMAS SOWELL, 
ETHNIC AMERICA: A HISTORY (1981 ). 
41. That is, that affirmative action is needed to diversify universities and workplaces that 
otherwise rrtight be practically all white. 
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benefits to minority groups" (Ogletree, pp. 164-65). The other authors offer 
nothing nearly so astute in their discussions of affirmative action. Tsesis 
comes closest when he observes that "[t]he nation rises or falls as a whole," 
so that helping promising minority students gain admission to top schools, 
where they will receive a first-rate education, not only helps heal old 
wounds, but also benefits the nation as a whole (Tsesis, p. 110). 
On the whole, these are strong, original books that should be on the 
bookshelf of every American interested in finding solutions to one of the 
United States' most intractable problems. 
III. THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK 
A Incorporating White Privilege into Racial Analysis 
Most civil-rights scholarship focuses on discrimination visited on people 
of color, women, and other outgroups. What of actions that do not discrimi­
nate against such groups but instead entrench white privilege? In a typical 
civil-rights violation, an empowered person, usually a white, commits an act 
of discrimination-such as hate speech, denial of a job, or rejection of a 
housing loan-against a black or Latino of lesser power and social standing. 
This may happen with or without conscious intent, and the act may be indi­
vidual, institutional, or a matter of social custom. The common thread is that 
they all render a member of a historically disenfranchised group worse off. 
Suppose, however, that the member of the dominant group acts not to 
disfavor such an individual, but to benefit another member of his or her own 
group? This ubiquitous practice raises the issue of white privilege: a series 
of interlocking favors, courtesies, benefits, and customs by which the domi­
nant group confers gains on one of its own.42 It includes the artfully crafted 
letter of recommendation that a teacher writes for a favorite white student, 
but does not write for the black student in the rear row who shows flashes of 
real talent.43 
White privilege includes suburban families who hire each other's chil­
dren, one to tend the yard while the family is away, the other to babysit its 
children; or, when they are older, provide them with summer internships in 
each other's companies to pad their resumes for college.44 It includes 
42. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED (1996) (analyzing the many varie­
ties of white privilege); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Peggy Mcintosh, 
White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences 
Through Work in Women's Studies (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 
189, 1988); see also MAURICE BERGER, WHITE LIES (1999) (discussing how white supremacy and 
institutional racism limit the life chances of people of color); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE 
INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS (1998) (same). 
43. Richard Delgado, 1998 Hugo L Black Lecture: Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Ac­
tion-How Valid?, 50 ALA. L. REV. 135, 150 (1998). 
44. Id. 
1280 Michigan Law Review [Vol. i04:1269 
conversational gambits,45 workplace expectations and norms that reward 
familiarity with white culture,46 and police officers who let neatly dressed 
white motorists off with a warning.47 It indlides companies that hire through 
the grapevine, so that African-American or Latino candidates have fewer 
chances of coming to their attention than do well-connected whites.48 It in­
cludes a host of other arrarigements, large and small, by which comfortably 
placed people help, reward, and validate their own. 
Is this a civil-rights issue? Yes. White privilege acts, like discrimination, 
as a socially stratifying force, but from the opposite direction. By concen­
trating wealth, comfort, and well-being, it polarizes society and widens the 
gap between the haves and the have-nots. Imagine a society that consists of 
two groups, the As and the Bs. More powerful and numerous than the Bs, 
the As tacitly agree to oppress them for fun and profit. They circulate stories 
and myths that the Bs are stupid and lazy. They exclude them from the best 
jobs, schools, and neighborhoods. 
Then one day the As undergo a change of heart. They realize that dis­
crimination is wrong and stop visiting it on the Bs. But the As still like each 
other best, and so continue favoring each other in a multitude of ways while 
excluding the Bs from their bounty. After active discrimination in the grind­
ing-someone-under-your-heel sense ended, would the Bs begin enjoying 
upward mobility, move into nice neighborhoods, get into good schools, win 
places in the Senate, and become CEOs of major corporations? If their old 
bete noir, the A group, deploys selective privilege to aid each other but not 
the Bs, the latter's progress will be slow indeed. 
Privilege and discrimination, then, are like two sides of a coin. They rep­
licate social relations in similar ways. One operates to submerge and 
eliminate the competition; the other to elevate and favor one's own kind. It 
is easy to deny that one is a racist. It is harder to deny that one is the benefi­
ciary of privilege or that one has on occasion doled it out to a favorite friend 
or relative.49 
45. Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the /mponance of Race: The Implica-
tion of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397. 
46. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000) . 
47. Mcintosh, supra note 42. 
48. Daniel Gross, In the Loop: A Lucrative Place to Be: The More Contacts You Have, The 
More You'll Be Paid, Study Says, INT'L HERALD Turn., Aug. 24, 2004, at Fin./Bus. 13 (interview 
with Kenneth Arrow). 
49. A rare example of judicial recognition of the need to consider white privilege and su­
premacy occurred in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. l (1967), a Supreme Court decision striking down 
a Virginia antimiscegenation statute. In Loving, an interracial couple challenged their state's Racial 
Integrity Act, which prohibited marriages between whites and nonwhites, on equal protection and 
due process grounds. Id. at 2, 6. The trial judge had suspended their sentences on condition that they 
leave the state and not return together for twenty-five years. Id. at 3. He rationalized his order by 
reasoning: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause 
for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the 
races to mix. 
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B. Beyondthe Black- White Paradigm of Race 
An emerging racial paradigm takes into account the fortunes of all the 
major ethnic groups of color, as well as whites.so It treats race and racism 
not as a series of localized flaws in an otherwise functional system, but as a 
broad feature affecting much of social life.st Race cannot be understood 
piecemeal, by examining its function in just one area alone. It requires atten­
tion to a host of factors cutting across several fields of knowledge and 
Id. At the time, Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited intermarriages, many of them 
through laws dating back to slavery. Id. at 6 n.5. 
On appeal, Virginia argued that its statute complied with equal protection because whites and 
nonwhites were similarly disadvantaged-neither could marry each other. Id. at 7-8. Brushing aside 
this argument, the Court found "no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial 
discrimination" to justify the statute. Id. at 11. "(T]hat Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justifi­
cation, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy." Id. It also went on to hold that the 
statute denied the Lovings liberty without due process of law. Id. at 12. Since marriage is one of the 
"basic civil rights of man/' to deny its exercise as Virginia did violated a fundamental right without 
adequate justification. Id. 
The Court's reasoning goes far beyond merely noticing that Virginia's criminal statute classi­
fied on the basis of race and thus violated the color-blind norm. Noting that Virginia's law left 
minorities free to marry members of their own group or of other minority groups, the Court con­
cluded that it could be aimed only at protecting the purity of the white race. Id. at 11-12. lf purity of 
the other races were important, the statute would have prohibited blacks, Asians, Indians, and Lati­
nos from marrying each other. Id. at 11 n.11. Instead, it only prevented them from marrying, as 
Richard Loving did, a member of the white race. 
The statute, then, looked beyond the usual evils that summon up equal protection: lack of 
color-blindness, racial classification, and unequal treatment of persons and groups that are similarly 
situated. It aimed to set whites on a marital-and perhaps eugenic-pedestal: pure, undefiled, and 
superior. The Court spent little time addressing the reasonableness of the classification-whether 
Virginia could demonstrate a compelling interest, and whether the statute was calculated to advance 
that interest in narrowly tailored fashion. Redolent of white supremacy, it could not stand regardless 
of whether the mandates of conventional equal protection doctrine were satisfied. It stood, justifia­
bly, on a higher plane of constitutional suspicion. 
The only Supreme Court decision to confront white supremacy and privilege, loving v. Vir­
ginia would seem to offer a promising starting point for a jurisprudence trained on those concepts. 
Such a jurisprudence would explore such issues as: 
Which practices and laws advance white privilege and well-being at the expense of other 
groups? 
Which practices and laws entrench privilege and superior status so deeply and irreversi­
bly that a society committed to equal opportunity should not tolerate them? 
What tests and criteria of cultural meaning can we use to aid ourselves in recognizing 
practices of white privilege? 
Future scholarship might well examine these and related questions, including the line-drawing 
challenges that are certain to arise: How blatantly must the measure benefit whites? Suppose the 
benefit concerns not marriage or another fundamental right, but an ordinary economic benefit, such 
as tax breaks for the rich-most of whom just happen to be white? Suppose the conduct is largely 
private, such as marital choices, or partly private and partly public, such as a standardized test in use 
by private and public schools that rewards familiarity with white culture? Might a white-supremacist 
measure ever be justified by a compelling state interest, such as wartime security? See Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
50. See sources cited supra note 21. 
51. JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMER­
ICA (2000) (offering broad coverage of civil rights and featuring each group of color, plus whites); 
Perea, supra note 21. 
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affecting the fortunes of whites, blacks, Latinos, Arabs, Asian Americans, 
and Native Americans in complex ways.52 
The new paradigm made its first appearance in fields other than law, 
such as labor history,53 whiteness studies,54 immigration studies,55 and ethnic 
histories.56 A few legal scholars now incorporate this approach into their 
work.57 A few, such as Juan Perea, have actively contributed to its develop­
ment.58 One recent treatment by a legal scholar demonstrated in detail 
exactly how ignoring the history of nonblack minority groups has backfired 
to the detriment of blacks on many occasions and how treating other groups 
as mere ancillaries to the black cause deprives blacks of much-needed al­
lies.59 
A racial paradigm that places one group-usually African Americans­
in the center and takes cognizance of the other groups only insofar as they 
succeed in analogizing themselves to the central group suffers a second 
drawback: it is apt to provide a poor quality of justice to the groups it lo­
cates on the margin.6() These other groups will receive redress for racial 
wrongs only to the extent to which they prove that what happened to them 
would have been actionable had it happened to an African American.61 Re­
call the example of the Filipino who could not recover for accent 
discrimination because our system of antidiscrimination remedies contained 
nothing that squarely addressed his predicament.62 Latinos complaining of 
discrimination on account of suspected illegal status, Asian Americans who 
receive diffident treatment because of the model-minority myth, or Native 
52. See, e.g., PEREA ET AL., supra note 51; Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to 
Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 283 (2000). 
53. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the role of work and unions in assimilating 
early immigrant groups); see also DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: 
EsSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY (1994) (showing how several racial 
forces interacted in the construction of white identity). 
54. See CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: ·LooKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 1997); PEREA ET AL., supra note 51, at 429-99. 
55. See RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA 
(1990) (reporting a classic study of ethnic white immigrants). 
56. See Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our 1ime, Soc. JusT., 
Spring-Summer 1993, at 22 (urging that contemporary racism is not merely a matter of black and 
white interactions). 
57. See sources cited supra note 21; PEREA ET AL., supra note 51. 
58. See Perea, supra note 21. 
59. See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit: Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 283 (2000). 
60. See id. 
61. See id. Recall, for example, how some African Americans were disappointed when Grut­
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), protected affirmative action as an aspect of advancing whites' 
interest in an effective economy and military. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently 
Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good for Business": T he Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and 
the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004). The Grutter opinion, in short, 
protected black interest as an aspect of whites'. Id. 
62. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
May 2006] The Current Landscape of Race 1283 
Americans thought to be favored children of federal largess also will be un­
able to recover.63 
IV. LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF THE NEW PARADIGM 
IN BROWN, OGLETREE, AND TSESIS 
Few legal writers consider white privilege when writing about racial dis­
crimination, and fewer still consider the complex dynamics that the demise 
of the black-white binary of race brings to light. As a result, many strong 
books lose analytical force as well as real-world applicability. 
How do the authors under review fare in these respects? Brown et al. are 
best at addressing white privilege. Employing the notions of social accumu­
lation and disaccumulation, they examine the means by which whites have 
assured themselves a dominant position generation after generation so that 
although blacks advance, the gap between them and whites remains constant 
(Brown et al., pp. 17-25, 231-32). Discussions of this kind are rarer in Tse­
sis or Ogletree, and even more so in other recent books about race.64 
Ogletree does note how well-off whites have established selective colleges 
and universities for their youth, like the ones he managed to attend, and have 
sent their sons and daughters there year after year (Ogletree, pp. 41-56). 
Other than this, white privilege is largely missing from his book. Tsesis is 
mainly concerned with old-fashioned discrimination and the many ways 
society deprives blacks of a full and enjoyable life. He devotes little atten­
tion to what is occurring on the other side of the equation and the dozens of 
ways by which whites help each other advance to the exclusion of others. 
Both authors could have incorporated white privilege to good advantage. 
Ogletree might, for example, have discussed how he felt as an undergradu­
ate at Stanford, surrounded by products of the nation's best prep schools, or 
how his colleagues in legal services defended their hiring policies, which 
largely excluded blacks, by falling back on the idea of merit. For his part, 
Tsesis might have shown how slave labor laid the foundation for white 
wealth, which continued long after abolition. 
Turning to the black-white binary of race, Ogletree, who grew up in 
California, cannot help but mention Latinos at various points-although his 
book is primarily about blacks (Ogletree, pp. 32-34, 44, 54-55, 82, 143, 
151, 162, 260-63, 265-66). He mentions that the composition of his ele­
mentary school was heavily black and Latino, and the photographs 
reproduced in his book confirm this. In the chapter on his Stanford days, 
Latino students make their appearance as fellow demonstrators (Ogletree, p. 
55). Later, when he discusses recent trends in school segregation, he again 
mentions the fortunes of Latino children (Ogletree, pp. 260-63). Ogletree 
63. See Delgado, supra note 59. 
64. E.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: Brown v. Board of Education AND THE UN­
FULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) (dwelling mainly on the fortunes of African 
Americans and devoting little attention to white privilege and nest-feathering); F. MICHAEL 
HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2005) (same). 
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thus seems relatively ecumenical in his concerns; although Latinos make 
only infrequent appearances in his book, they are not entirely absent, nor 
does he make any conscious effort to exclude them. 
Tsesis's book is a different story. Wedded to an abolitionist theory of ra­
cial remediation, Tsesis seems determined to make that single model work 
for all minorities, even those who have no history of enslavement.65 This 
makes little sense. Whites did not want labor from the Indians, but their 
land. Fearless, and with intimate knowledge of the local terrain, Indians 
would fight to the death rather than suffer enslavement. Whites wanted 
something different from the Mexicans: first, their land, and later, low-paid 
migrant agricultural labor in work crews and camps. From Asians, U.S. so­
ciety wanted yet another set of commodities: at first, labor in building the 
nation's railroads and mines, and later, technical services as the "model mi­
nority" keeping the nation's computers and office machines humming 
efficiently. 66 
This simplified summary points up something that Tsesis and some 
other writers ignore: namely, how a theory of black civil rights can do jus­
tice to only some of the types of mistreatment society visits on nonblack 
groups. The Japanese did not need reparations for slavery; they needed repa­
rations for wartime internment. Latinos do not need freedom from the 
badges and incidents of slavery but from the badges and incidents of con­
quest, including cultural destruction, loss of ancestral lands, and a school 
system seemingly bent on steadily suppressing their history and language.67 
A model of redress needs to suit the history and culture of the group for 
which it is applied. True, society every now and then will treat Asians or 
Latinos as it did the slaves; for example, forcing them into coolie labor or 
onto farm-worker crews with few freedoms or opportunities to leave and 
pursue other options.68 In these circumstances, nothing is wrong with apply­
ing an abolitionist model or a statute derived from that tradition. But, as 
explained earlier, other groups experience many indignities that African 
Americans ordinarily do not.69 Trying to force these into a paradigm not de­
signed for them guarantees poor results. 
Tsesis's book fares poorly on this score although it fares well in other 
respects. What about Brown et al.? Whitewashing Race is gratifyingly broad 
in its treatment of white privilege and racial hoarding (Brown et al., pp. 22-
25, 231-32), and is properly scathing in its criticism of administrators and 
65. In a faculty workshop, I asked the author if his Thirteenth Amendment approach would 
work for all minorities. He insisted it would. Alexander Tsesis, Address at the University of Pitts­
burgh Law School (Nov. 2004) (notes on file with author). 
66. On the model-minority myth, see PEREA ET AL, supra note 51, at 412, 413-16, 419, 980. 
67. On the role of conquest in Latino history, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo and Revision­
ism: Relearning the Lessons of History, 99 Nw. U. L. R..Ev. 805, 824-32 (2005) (book review); Juan 
F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing the Trajectories of Con­
quest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283 (2003). 
68. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'! Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137 
(2002); PEREA ET AL, supra note 51, at 31 2-16, 320, 369-70, 395-97, 416-21. 
69. See supra notes 17-20 and 46-48 and accompanying text. 
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policy planners who enacted legislation that enabled whites to get ahead at 
the expense of minorities (Brown et al., pp. 75-79, 92-93). Despite this, its 
treatment of nonblack minorities is confounding. In the introduction, these 
California authors explain that they "focus largely on black and white . . .  
because the conservative consensus on race is mostly constructed around the 
relationship between black and white" (Brown et al., p. x). True to their 
promise, Latinos, Asians, and Indians are virtually absent from their pages; 
their discussion proceeds almost entirely in black-white binary terms. 
This, of course, is merely to explain racism with more racism. Further­
more, it is simply untrue. Conservatives such as Samuel Huntington70 and 
Peter Brimelow71 have written forceful and ugly books about Latino cultural 
inferiority; the cable news pundits editorialize against this group regularly;72 
and fearful voters in the authors' own state enacted three referenda-English 
Only,73 Proposition 18?74 (which denied immigrants public services, includ­
ing education), and the California Civil Rights Initiative, Proposition 20975 
(the antiaffirmative action measure)-aimed at the Latino population. When 
Brown and his coauthors blithely declare Latinos irrelevant to racial analy­
sis, one wonders whether they read their own newspapers or realized that 
their state is nearly one-third Latino but only 6.7 percent black. 
Brown et al. explain that discrimination against African Americans is 
older than that against the other groups (Brown et al., pp. ix-x), shapes indi­
vidual housing choices in a way that antipathies toward the other groups do 
not (p. xi), and is a foundational part of U.S. culture and history (Brown et 
al., p. x) (in short, black exceptionalism). These rationalizations are unwor­
thy of serious social scientists. All the groups are exceptional-blacks 
suffered slavery; Indians suffered removal and extermination (what could be 
more foundational than that?); Mexican Americans suffered conquest and 
the loss of one-half of their country in a pretextual war, followed by colonial 
occupation and suppression of culture, language, and land tenure. Puerto 
Rico is a United States colony, pure and simple. Japanese Americans were 
interned during World War II, losing businesses, homes, and farms on the 
strength of fabricated evidence, merely because they looked like the wartime 
70. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 243 (2004) (warning that America's core values could suffer dilution if too many Latino 
immigrants gain admission). 
71. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER (1995) (warning against disastrous consequences of excessive immigration). 
72. For instance, Lou Dobbs in his "Broken Borders" series and in other segments on Lou 
Dobbs Tonight exhibits thinly veiled hostility toward Mexican immigrants. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs 
Tonight (CNN television broadcast Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/ldt.html; Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Aug. 23, 2005), available 
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ldt.html. 
73. CAL. CONST. art. m § 6(b) (providing that English is the official language in a state with 
a heavy Latino population). 
74. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
75. CAL. CONST. art. I §  31 (providing that the state shall not discriminate or grant preferen­
tial treatment on the basis of race and a number of other factors). 
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enemy.76 While blacks may be slightly more segregated than Latinos in 
housing, the latter are the most segregated group in public schools and suf­
fer by far the highest dropout rate.77 
One wonders whether Brown et al., would have done better not to ex­
plain or attempt to justify their decision to omit nonblack groups at all. After 
all, nothing is wrong with writing about one minority group, as Ogletree 
did, but it should be done without insulting the others or trivializing their 
experience. The reader does miss out on the big picture, but for some pur­
poses it may be perfectly sensible to limit one's coverage in that respect. It 
is not necessary to demean the other groups or their suffering at the same 
time. Moreover, to imply, as Brown and his coauthors do, that Latinos and 
Asians are irrelevant to racial analysis, especially in today's climate, simply 
beggars belief. 
CONCLUSION: ONCE THE DOG BARKS, THEN WHAT? 
These three books, excellent in many ways, exhibit some of the best fea­
tures of recent writing about race. One-Tsesis's--deploys legal history and 
doctrinal innovation in the search for a way to avoid the many hurdles that 
the Supreme Court has placed in the way of civil-rights remedies. Ogletree 
expertly uses legal storytelling in his account of a half-century of civil-rights 
history so as to rekindle conscience and engage the sympathies of readers 
with sympathy to share. Brown and his coauthors marshal an impressive 
array of social-science evidence to refute the central teachings of a new 
school of tough-love neoconservative critics of race-conscious remedies. 
Inadequate coverage of white privilege mars two of the books, and ne­
glect of issues affecting nonblack minorities, such as Asian Americans, 
Arabs, Native Americans, and Latinos, blights all three. Writers attempting 
to make sense of the United States' racial predicament must expand their 
analysis to take account of these two issues. They must pay attention to 
white privilege-to what is taking place on the other side of the racial di­
vide-just as they must consider the fortunes of nonblack groups-certainly 
when these intersect with those of blacks, but especially when they do not. 
76. Other U.S. citizens looked like wartime enemies-the Germans and Italians-yet were 
not interned. 
77.  See Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neo­
liberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 Tux. L. REV. 489, 503-04 & nn .90-9 1 (2004) (book review). 
